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FROM

Hon. J. G. Palfrey

SPEECH
OF
HON. S. W. DOWNS, OF LOUISIANA,
ON
THE WAR WITH MEXICO.

DELIVERED

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MONDAY, JANUARY 31, 1848:

WITH AN APPENDIX, SHOWING—

1. Public opinion abroad as to our conquest of Mexico.
2. That if this conquest does take place, it will be owing to the folly of Mexico, and the course of those among us who oppose the vigorous prosecution of the war.
3. Population and territory of Mexico.
4. Trade of the United States with Mexico.
5. British encroachments.

WASHINGTON:
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1848.

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of Cambridge

THE WAR WITH MEXICO.

The Bill reported from the Committee on Military Affairs to raise, for a limited time, an additional Military Force, being under consideration:

Mr. DOWNS said:

I had no intention, Mr. President, when this bill first came up in the Senate, to say anything upon the subject. I thought, sir, that our progress in this war with Mexico was such—we having advanced to the interior of that country, taken possession of its capital, and accomplished everything, practically, that the army and the President could have accomplished—that at the meeting of this Congress, when it came together, it would, in its deliberations upon this subject, rather indicate what further steps should be taken in the matter, and would occupy their time in action rather than words. I had no expectation whatever, when this bill was first introduced, that its passage would be delayed, and that the measures recommended by the President would be opposed.

I find, however, that I have been very much mistaken. When it was proposed, for the first time, to take up this bill, I happened not to be in the Senate on that day, and I believe it was the only day in which I was absent since the commencement of the session; but, upon inquiring, I found that opposition was made to such consideration, and there was a very close vote as to whether the bill should be taken up. I understood from that fact, at that time, that some obstructions would be thrown in the way of its passage; but, still, I did not anticipate that decided opposition to the bill, which has since been manifested on the other side of the Chamber.

Mr. President, as we have had so much discussion, and so much difference of opinion as to the origin of this war, and as, perhaps, we shall hereafter have a difference of opinion as to the question by whom the opposition to the bill was commenced, I wish to place on record the history, as I understand it, of this debate. In so doing, it will be necessary for me to allude to the course of certain Senators upon this all-important subject; for in relation to the history of the action of the Senate, in the debate on this bill, I do not, for one, desire to have the question left in doubt as to who commenced or protracted this war of discussion. When the attempt was first made, sir, to call this bill up for consideration, the objection, as I understood from the "Official Proceedings," to taking it

up was not one of direct opposition to the bill, but simply whether it should be taken up or not at that time. At all events, that appeared to be the light in which it was regarded by the chairman of the Military Committee.

We soon, however, came to another stage of procedure in this matter. Some days after, when the bill was again called up, an amendment was offered by the Senator from Kentucky, [Mr. CATTENBEN,] to change the provisions, &c. Still I did not understand that to be opposition to the bill; for, if I understood the Senator's remarks on that subject, it was not denied that the President should be properly sustained in the conduct of this war. And I am more confirmed in that opinion, from an incident that occurred about that period. In some preliminary discussion at that time, I recollect very distinctly that the honorable Senator from Kentucky seemed to be very much surprised at an incidental remark that fell from the Senator from Mississippi—viz: that the prosecution of the war had been delayed, or procrastinated, by Congress. I confess that I was very much of the opinion of the Senator from Kentucky, and I thought that the objection of the Senator from Mississippi was not so well founded as he affirmed it to be. I supposed that there had been no serious objection at the former session designed against the particular measures recommended for the prosecution of the war. I did not understand from the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky that such opposition was intended, but that there was only some difference of opinion as to the details of this particular measure. But, Mr. President, we soon arrived at other stages of this business. It was remarked the other day, by an honorable Senator on the other side, (I do not now recollect which,) that the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, and those connected with him in the support of this bill, were "making considerable progress"—that he had at first disclaimed all idea of the conquest of all Mexico, but that he now seemed to be disposed to regard it as not so unreasonable, or so monstrous—that such an idea might be tolerated—and that therefore he was making some progress.

Now, I must say, in reply, that those who are thus charging us with inconsistency, are changing the position which they had assumed at the commencement very rapidly. It is they who have been making progress; but I must be allowed to say it is a progress backwards. From the time

when the bill was first proposed to the present moment, they have manifested an increasing opposition to the prosecution of this war. Not only do they find fault with the suggestions of the President of the United States, with the suggestions of the War Department, with the reports of the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, and with all the authorities usually allowed on such occasions, but they resist and contest them at every point, and have denounced in the strongest terms the prosecution of the war. That was the stage, in the course of their procedure upon this subject, marked out by the Senator from Delaware. But they did not stop there. There was still another stage. Where they will stop in their onward career, I cannot say; for, soon after, another honorable Senator (the Senator from Connecticut) offered a resolution which took still higher ground: in the first place, that Mexico had no public domain; and, secondly, if she had, she had no power to cede any of said territory to us; and, therefore, our idea of acquiring territory for indemnity was altogether futile. Such has been the progress of the opposition to this bill; and I must confess, sir, that every additional step that has been made has but astonished me the more. These latter positions assumed by an honorable Senator have especially astonished me more than all the rest. What are they? Why, that Mexico has no public domain, and that we can get nothing from her. Well, sir, I will not stop to discuss that question, for I care very little whether she has any public domain or not, though I understand the fact very differently. I understand that Mexico has a public domain. I think it very immaterial, and that the acquisition of territory for the public land it brings into the country is of no great advantage. In regard to public lands generally, and in respect particularly to the immense territory we have held, I think they bring in but very little income to the Government. I venture to say, that on examination in respect to the value of the public lands in this country, after deducting the expenses of surveys, purchases, and the other necessary expenses, it would be found that it has been by no means a money-making business. There are other advantages in the acquisition of territory besides the mere value of the land. The increase of population, of commerce, and consequently of revenue resulting from such acquisition, must be taken into account. Suppose we had never received a dollar out of the immense territory acquired by the acquisition of Louisiana, would not the acquisition, considering the millions of revenue received at New Orleans, have been a sufficient inducement to its acquirement? I believe Mexico has a public domain to cede; but whether she has or not, I do not care a straw. We want the territory for the spread of population, the increase of our commerce, and the extension of our liberties, just as we wanted Louisiana and the valley of the Mississippi, Floridas, and Texas. I shall not follow the Senator in his argument on this point. He cited from a work on international law, of which I profess to know but little. I shall not, then, follow him in that quotation. But I should think that such law as that which he cited is at variance with the practice of all nations, contrary to common sense, and not to be tolerated in this age of the world. How, I would ask, did we acquire the very ground on which this Capitol

stands? Tradition records, that the Indians once lighted their council-fires on this very hill; would the Senator then have it, that we have no title to this, the site of our Capitol, and that the remnant of these Indians could at any time justly eject us from its possession? But if the Senator's argument should be correct, that Mexico has no power to cede territory, how will that help his cause? It will only make it the more necessary for us to take it, if she cannot cede it.

Such, then, sir, is the history of the opposition, thus far, to this bill. Before I proceed further, however, I will advert to an argument made by the honorable Senator from Vermont, [Mr. PHELPS,] who last addressed the Senate. In the conclusion of his remarks, he complained of the exercise of what he was pleased to term, an almost despotic military power, in the hands of the President of the United States in Mexico, and declaimed, at some length, against the dangers of an abuse of a military authority. But does not this military power continue to be exercised by the President, in the very necessity of the case, and because that legal provision has not yet been made by which he would have been relieved of that responsibility? So far from being desirous to hold California and New Mexico by military tenure, rather than by the organization of civil government, the President has been anxious to be relieved of that responsibility, which the circumstances of the case have devolved upon him, and the gentleman from Vermont can at any time contribute his share in the removal of that much of the military power of the President, by establishing civil or territorial government.

There is another preliminary remark which I desire to make, and it is in reference to the astonishing distrust manifested on the other side of the Chamber, with respect to the recommendation of the President, the Secretary of War, and the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs. I believe it has hitherto been generally considered, that in cases where the honor and interest of the country are involved in a controversy with a foreign Power, party spirit should be assuaged. And I think the history of the country shows, that in the highest party times, when such cases have arisen, party spirit has subsided. It was so, I recollect, some years ago, when the question of the northeastern boundary was in agitation. Then, nearly by unanimous consent—indeed, I believe it was unanimous—means were placed at the disposal of the President to meet any contingency which might arise. So it was also, I believe, at the commencement of this war; but the spirit of party opposition has gradually arisen, and every measure suggested for the prosecution of the war is now most scrupulously scrutinized.

I now proceed to give some of the grounds of my vote upon this bill, in addition to the reasons given for its passage by the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, and so eloquently sustained by another member of the committee, [the Senator from Mississippi, Col. DAVIS,] whose heroic and skillful exploits in two of the most brilliant battles—and I regret to say, also, as his own honorable wounds but too clearly attest, the most bloody battles of the war—Monterey and Buena Vista—add a weight to whatever he says on this subject, which, it seems to me, ought to be conclusive. I felt sure it would be so then, but I find I was

mistaken. His arguments have not been answered; they never can or will be answered on this floor or elsewhere. Still, opposition to the bill appears to have constantly increased from that day to this. My thanks, and the thanks of this body and of the country, are due to the honorable Senator from Mississippi, [Col. DAVIS,] who is on the military committee, for what he said on the amendment offered by the Senator from Kentucky. That amendment seemed almost to have reduced the friends of this bill to the necessity of undervaluing the efficiency of volunteers, or to adopt the amendment. There is a difference of opinion on this subject, both in the army and elsewhere. The honorable Senator was identified with both arms of the service, regulars and volunteers, and could have no partiality for either. Few men occupy the same position in this particular; he has said, therefore, all that is proper or necessary on the occasion, and, I have no doubt, satisfied both parties, that for the services contemplated regulars are to be preferred. While expressing, then, my thanks to that Senator, and my full concurrence in all he said on the respective merits of volunteers and regulars, giving preference to neither in their appropriate sphere, but doing ample credit to both, I take occasion to state a fact, and an opinion of volunteers, I once heard from a very distinguished officer of the regular army in the war of 1812, now no more, and who, like my friend from Mississippi, bore about him wounds received on the battle-fields of his country, and which, I believe, at last carried him prematurely to the grave—I mean the late General Ripley. I thought the fact stated, and the opinion given, a little extravagant. I now believe them both perfectly true. He said, that in all the annals of American warfare, American volunteers, in any thing like equal numbers, never had been beaten, and never could while our present institutions existed. The battle-fields of New Orleans, Buena Vista, Cerro Gordo, Brazito, Sacramento, and others, attest the truth of what he said.

In the debates on this bill, there has been, I think, some incorrectness in the statements of those who oppose the bill, no doubt unintentional, as to the force now authorized and required by the Executive and the committee, calculated to lead to error. It has been variously stated by different speakers, from ninety to a hundred thousand men, and the increase contemplated by the bill now under consideration, and the bill for twenty regiments of volunteers, as increasing the actual force in service thirty thousand men. I do not so understand it. As I understand it, from the reports of the Adjutant General's office, the present forces authorized are:

Regulars	30,350
Volunteers	32,816
Total authorized	63,166

If we add to this the ten regiments contemplated by this bill, we make the whole amount 73,166. The force in actual service, from the last returns, are:

Regulars	20,333
Volunteers	20,286
Volunteers from Michigan and Alabama, on their way.....	2,200
Making, in all, in actual service...	42,719

From these statements, it will appear that the number that can be kept in service, of those autho-

rized by law, is about two-thirds. This calculation will give for the actual force in service, after the ten new regiments are added, about 48,925—say fifty thousand men. And if the twenty additional regiments of volunteers be added to the forces previously authorized, the number that would be actually kept in service, according to this mode of calculation, would be 62,000. This bill, and the bill authorizing the twenty regiments of volunteers, does not, as has been represented, add thirty thousand men to the number in actual service. They do not necessarily add a single man to either arm of the service; they only authorize the President to do so, if he deems it necessary.

While on this branch of the subject, I desire to make a few remarks in reply to the arguments offered against the bill, and in favor of the amendment submitted by the Senator from South Carolina, [Mr. BUTLER,] which is still pending. That amendment proposes, instead of increasing the number of the regiments, to add a certain number of men to each company. I do not know much about military affairs, sir, but I confess that this amendment struck me as rather extraordinary, particularly when it was considered that the peace establishment of the United States had been already very much augmented in the manner proposed in the amendment; and above all, after the remarkable manifestations which the army had given of its efficiency under the present organization. The experiment of making that change in this organization appeared to me to be of doubtful expediency, to say the least of it. A slight departure, even from an established system which has proved so eminently efficient, might be attended with danger. I do not say that there would positively be danger in making the change proposed by the amendment, but I prefer leaving the organization of the army precisely as it is at present. The Senator from South Carolina recommends his amendment on the score of economy. In some cases, great economy is the worst economy. We cannot expect, when we go to war, that we can prosecute it without expense. I perfectly agree with gentlemen, who declare that when we go to war, we must pay for it. We must tax the people. I regard as one of the consequences of this war, the necessity of imposing taxes to meet the expenditures. I admit that at once, and am ready to go as far as any reasonable man, in the imposition of taxes, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of this war. The expense I know must be great, and for it we must provide. But considerations of economy are not to enter into the calculations of a people, when they find it necessary to enter into a war. The great object of war is success, and that is to be sought at any cost. We are now engaged in war, and we must prosecute it to a successful close. It is no time now to sit down, and counting the cost, cut off some of the odds and ends. If economy is our object, why not strike off half of the officers of the army? If we are to adopt this economical policy, why not proceed to cut down all the officers? I have no fear as to our inability to meet the expenses of this war. We have met them thus far, and we shall be fully able to meet them hereafter. I cannot, therefore, concur in the amendment of the Senator from South Carolina.

In the course of the argument on that amendment, something was said about the patronage of the Executive, and in reference to that, I have a

few words to offer. I know that complaints have been made with reference to the patronage dispensed by the Executive in the appointment of the principal officers of the army engaged in this war. But I think, sir, that an attentive examination of the army list will furnish evidence of some justification for the conduct of the Executive. At the head of the list, there does seem to be a considerable preponderance of Democratic names; but if you look further down, you will discover that the officers appointed by the Executives of those States in which Whig influence prevails, have been selected from the ranks of that party. For myself, I would never permit such distinctions of party to operate in the selection of officers for the armies of the country; and never, in any recommendations which I have made, have such distinctions been permitted to exercise the slightest influence. In the defence of the honor and interests of the country, Whigs and Democrats alike have participated, and should fairly share in the offices and emoluments of the army. If the President had acted in this matter in the exclusive spirit that has been alleged against him, I should have condemned him most emphatically. But when I find that the spirit of exclusiveness in appointments to office commenced on the other side, before the general staff was organized, I believe that the President was not at all to blame in attempting to make something like a balance, by appointing a large number of Democrats.

Mr. MANGUM. If the honorable Senator will allow me, I would remark, in reference to my own State, that such a course as he describes was not adopted by the Executive of that State; and that a very meritorious and scientific gentleman of the Democratic party received an appointment; indeed, I believe that all the appointments were made irrespective of party considerations. As the Senator is aware, we had a Whig Executive in that State.

Mr. DOWNS. I am very glad that the honorable Senator interrupted me, because if in error, at any time, I shall always be happy to be corrected. I recollect an instance in the gentleman's own State, which sustains me in the position I have assumed with respect to these appointments of the Executives of the States. I had the pleasure of being introduced, last summer, to a gentleman who commanded one of the new regiments in the regular army, (Colonel Wilson,) and ascertained the fact, that although a man of wealth and standing in the community, having volunteered when the first call was made on the country, and been elected to some subordinate office, yet, contrary to general expectation, he did not receive from the State Executive the command of one of the regiments, and that, in consequence of the neglect, the President appointed him to the command of one of the new regiments. But I regarded it as a very strong case in point, and I had it in view when I made the remark which elicited the interruption of the honorable Senator.

Mr. MANGUM. The fact is as stated by the honorable Senator. Colonel Wilson was afterwards appointed by the Executive here, and two strong letters from the Whig Senators of this body were written recommending him to the appointment. That was the spirit which, so far as I know, characterized the public authorities of North Carolina.

Mr. DOWNS. I have no knowledge of the

proceedings in North Carolina except in this instance, which, I confess, struck me as one of those affording a justification of the course of the President. I did not, however, intend to refer to a particular case, but to speak generally of the course which had been taken in making the appointments. I do not pretend to go into all the instances occurring in the several States, but I speak of the general result, and I believe that, upon investigation, it will be found that a large portion of the appointments of officers were made from the party which is opposed to the President in their political views. This, sir, I believe, has been the liberal course of the Executive on this subject.

Before I quit this part of the subject, there is one other reason which I will state, why I prefer regular forces to volunteers. Their duties are very much the same, and as the war is conducted their period of service will be much the same, yet the difference between the officers of this description of force is very material.

The volunteer officers not holding their commissions from the United States, there is no opportunity for promotion. They may go there and fight for years, and though they perform the same duties as are performed by the officers of the regular army and achieve as gallant exploits, yet they can receive no advancement. Those who begin as captains will be captains still, and those who command as lieutenants will be lieutenants still.

There was a remark made by the honorable Senator from South Carolina who last addressed the Senate upon this subject, [Mr. BUTLER,] and who offered an amendment to this bill, in which I cannot concur. It seemed to be based upon the idea that the engagement of volunteers or the enlistment of regular troops could not be accomplished. He says:

"Why is it that the Executive, as we are informed, cannot raise the number of troops which by law he has authority to raise, for carrying on this war in the heart of Mexico? Why is it? Does it arise from popular aversion against entering into such a service as this? If it were a war for the defence of our own soil, do you believe that five times that number could not be called into requisition? Sir, at the voice of the Executive of the United States, ten times that number would spring up, ready to defend the national honor and the soil of the Republic. And I must here make another remark. If all parties in the United States, were to concur in the justice and propriety of carrying on this war, I would answer for it that the President could not say that it was out of his power to raise the number of troops which the laws of the country authorize him to raise. But, sir, the very fact that he is unable to raise these troops by the means which have been put in his power, is, I think, one of the omens which a wise ruler should regard in administering the trust—the sacred trust—that is committed to him."

Now, I do not understand the President as taking any such ground. I have never understood that there has been a single case in which a call has been made for volunteers in which that call has not been fully and completely answered. In Kentucky, Tennessee, and, in fact, in all the States, the last calls were not only responded to at once, but more men were offered than could be received.

Mr. BUTLER. I beg to interrupt the Senator for a moment. He has not exactly stated my proposition. In contending, as I did contend, that if the additional troops called for were necessary, they could be supplied in the manner proposed by my amendment to the bill, I asked the question, why not raise them in this way? One answer was, that the men would prefer entering a new organization. But my proposition was, that if addi-

tional troops were needed, they could be added to the old regiments, instead of incurring the expense of creating new ones.

Mr. DOWNS. I do not see, in the remarks of the Senator, any distinction between the two descriptions of forces. On the contrary, the ten regiments authorized by the bill of last session were filled up with extraordinary rapidity. I do not know that there is any complaint in the recruiting for the old regiments. Almost every newspaper that was received from New Orleans announced the arrival of fresh troops, to fill up the reduced companies.

But while upon this subject, permit me to make another remark, as an additional reason for the passage of this bill. There is no doubt that recruiting in the new regiments will be more rapid than in the old regiments. And the reason is, that when you appoint officers from civil life, they go into the country where they are known, and, consequently, the men the more readily undertake to serve under them.

I do not know certainly how many of our troops in Mexico were lost in battle and by disease, respectively, but I suppose at least as many were lost by the last as by the first. Many at any rate fell by disease, and in consequence of the late period in which they arrived at Vera Cruz.

If we then pass this bill at once, we can send them off at an early period, so as to escape the diseases of the climate, which have been heretofore encountered. But if we continue to debate the bill indefinitely, if we go on talking without acting, we shall not only do as was done last session, but the evil will be much greater than last year; because this is a very long session, and may be extended indefinitely to the midst of summer; whereas, last year, the delay could not extend beyond the fourth of March. It was for reasons of this kind, as stated by the honorable chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, that I thought it would be far preferable to pass this bill without any unnecessary delay.

As the remarks which I shall make are in a great degree in answer to arguments which have been made in opposition to the bill, I must say that I should not have spoken at all, if it had not been for those arguments.

I now wish to advert to another of the positions assumed by the honorable Senator from South Carolina, and lest I should be mistaken, I will quote the language of the gentleman:

"But, sir, that is as far as I will go as an *ultimatum* of any proposition of peace to that Government. I would insist, in the first instance, in all measures of negotiation, that to the Rio Grande we are bound, under the most solemn of pledges, to protect the rights of Texas. But then the question may be asked—and it is a proper question—how would you establish any other line for separating the territories of the United States from those of Mexico? Will you fall back upon the line which separates Oregon from Mexico? I think not, sir. But, by way of making it an acceptable as possible to Mexico, and with a sincere desire to terminate this war, I would not hesitate, if it were to be done to-morrow, to send the most illustrious embassy to Mexico, and to propose to her terms of peace upon this *ultimatum*, with the right, however, to demand from her to say what line she should run by way of compensating us for the claims we have against her, and I should think it no degradation."

Now, I have a very great objection to the first proposition considered in this extract. I object totally and peremptorily to sending any more ambassadors to Mexico. We have sent too many already. The President was right at first, how-

ever, because our true policy is for peace, where it can be honorably obtained. Yet, although the President at the early stages of this war did make them these offers of peace, nothing has been done towards the conclusion of a peace by them. Even now, after they are completely overthrown, their capital taken, and army destroyed, still terms of peace are rejected.

Under these circumstances, we ought not to send them another ambassador, high or low. We have made propositions many times, and they would not accept them—we have now conquered them—they are in our power. Shall we, then, solicit again until they consent to treat with us? If I were to send an embassy at all, it should not be with such an ultimatum as the honorable Senator from South Carolina proposes. Why should we now agree to take the Oregon boundary as the extent of our title, giving them to understand that we expect nothing more, and leaving to themselves to propose a boundary for indemnity?

This would be giving them new life or encouragement. If the President could be so weak as to present such a proposition, they would say at once "there is some mystery in this sudden change, some difficulty in the affairs of the American Government," which would encourage them to persevere in hostilities, under the impression that we would ultimately be compelled to give up our conquests; and this would be a reasonable conclusion from such a proposition.

I now come to some general remarks which I wish to make upon the question of the war with Mexico. And first, sir, I have to say that there is one thing which has appeared to me very singular in this discussion on the part of gentlemen on the other side of the Chamber. The President in his message has declared what he thinks is the right course to be pursued; and gentlemen of the Democratic party generally, have concurred with the views he has taken; while those on the opposite side object to the policy in the most decided manner. But they do not tell us what they would do. It is very easy to find fault, but not so easy to tell us what would be the right course to pursue.

The studied silence of our opponents on this subject is the more surprising, because we had indications, before the meeting of this session of Congress, that the objects of the war ought to be declared, and the President compelled to abide by them. Mr. Clay, in his Lexington speech, said:

"I conclude, therefore, Mr. President and fellow-citizens, with entire confidence, that Congress has the right, either at the beginning or during the prosecution of any war, to decide the objects and purposes for which it was proclaimed, or for which it ought to be continued. And I think it is the duty of Congress, by some deliberate and authentic act, to declare for what objects the present war shall be longer prosecuted. I suppose the President would not hesitate to regulate his conduct by the pronounced will of Congress, and to employ the force and the diplomatic power of the nation to execute that will. But if the President should decline or refuse to do so, and, in contempt of the supreme authority of Congress, should persevere in waging the war for other objects than those proclaimed by Congress, then it would be the imperative duty of that body to vindicate its authority by the most stringent, and effectual, and appropriate measures. And if, on the contrary, the enemy should refuse to conclude a treaty containing stipulations securing the objects designated by Congress, it would become the duty of the whole Government to prosecute the war with all the national energy, until those objects were attained by a treaty of peace. There can be no insuperable difficulty in Congress making such an authoritative declaration. Let it resolve, simply, that the war shall, or shall not, be a war of conquest; and, if a war of conquest, what is to be con-

quered. Should a resolution pass disclaiming the design of conquest, peace would follow in less than sixty days, if the President would conform to his constitutional duty."

This is frank and decided. I do not see any reasonable objections to the course suggested.

I do not know what the President's opinions are—I speak only for myself—but I would be very glad, and I think the President would also be gratified, if Congress would adopt such a course. Why has not this course been adopted?

There has been another announcement of this principle, and a very emphatic one, from another quarter.

I read only this morning, this decided declaration of opinion from a gentleman in another department of the General Government:

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1848.

"**MY DEAR SIR :** To all human appearance, the termination of this miserable war with Mexico is more remote than when the first blow was struck. In my judgment, it was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by marching our army into disputed territory in the possession of Mexico. And I think that Congress, who unquestionably have the power, should put an end to the war on just and honorable principles.

"After agreeing upon the terms on which a treaty should be made, they should call upon the Executive by resolution to offer a peace to Mexico upon that basis, and, during the negotiation, hostilities should be suspended. If the President shall refuse to do this, in the military appropriation bills the army should be required to take such positions as shall carry out the views of Congress. These bills the President could not veto, and he would be bound by their requirements. This may be done by the House.

"JOHN MCLEAN."

This is perfectly frank and clear, and admits of no doubt.

If gentlemen approve of this doctrine let them subscribe to it boldly. There it is. I want a simple response—yes or no. Do you approve of it, or do you not? I have, and the people have, a right to demand from gentlemen on the other side, what are their views?

I have no idea that there will be any peace until the Presidential election is over; and is it to be supposed that the people are going to vote in the dark?

I do hope, then, that those gentlemen who differ with us so much, and find so much fault, will propose a plan of their own, or, at all events, that they will say on this question, yea or nay. Let them sign the bond. Here it is in unequivocal terms.

I want to know whether they will propose to withdraw the army, to give up, not only the indemnity of millions, which our citizens claim, but say that all the blood and treasure which has been spent in this war, shall be thrown away; or whether, in the spirit of the suggestion made by the honorable Senator from South Carolina, go to Mexico, and fall on our knees, and entreat that she will make peace on her own terms.

Mr. BUTLER. I beg the Senator will allow me to say, that I never assumed any such proposition; and I do not think that my language, on the occasion referred to, at all justifies such an inference as has been drawn. I am quite at a loss to know how the gentleman could have arrived at such a conclusion. I certainly said that I would allow Mexico the privilege of indicating a line, without at all pledging myself to accede to it. I did not wish to extort terms from her, under duress, at the mouth of the cannon. So far as regards the indemnity due us, whatever be the amount, I stated that I would insist on an adjustment of it, allowing Mexico, simply, freedom in the conduct

of the negotiation—giving her the privilege of indicating such boundaries as would be most favorable to permanent peace between the two Republics. I said nothing to authorize the extravagant proposition of the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. DOWNS. The gentleman, I hope, did not understand me as saying he used those identical words, "falling on our knees." That was a mere figure of speech. I did think, however, and still think, that that was very much the meaning of the language employed by the honorable Senator.

In the line of argument which I have marked out for myself on this subject, I shall next proceed to consider the causes of the war. It is said that the President made this war by ordering the troops to the Rio Grande. I differ from this opinion totally.

I believe the war could not have been avoided, that it was the natural consequence of the conduct and the folly of the weak and imbecile Government of Mexico.

If it were necessary to look for other causes of the war than this conduct of Mexico, I could suggest another cause much more probable than that of the conduct of the President.

I believe it grew out of the obstinacy of the Mexican Government, in insisting upon her claim to the dominion of Texas, after all the principal nations of the world had recognized her as an independent republic. But if I should look for other causes than this at home, and if I should say that it arose not alone from the perversity of Mexico, but from the actions and opinions of certain persons within the United States, I should be much nearer the truth than by attributing it to any act of the President or of General Taylor. It was more owing to the position taken by certain persons in this country. I allude to the announcement made, in 1844, from a very high quarter, that the annexation of Texas was a cause of war. Mr. Clay, in his letter of 1844, says:

"I consider the annexation of Texas at this time, without the assent of Mexico, compromising the national character, and involving us certainly in war with Mexico and probably with other foreign Powers."

This cry has been kept up ever since, and is the more likely to be the cause of the war than any act of the President.

Now I do not say that this declaration was the cause of the war; very far from it; but if we are to attribute it to any cause arising within the country, this is the cause to which I would point. There were peculiar circumstances which gave to this declaration extraordinary weight with Mexico at that time.

The very fact that two great Powers of Europe, England and France, interfered in a most unusual and extraordinary manner to prevent annexation, encouraged Mexico in the delusion that she must make this a cause of war with us, and that she would be sustained in it by the public opinion, at least of those countries, if not the civilized world. They, in addition to the feelings of dread at our rapid encroachments in greatness, commerce, and power, had peculiar reasons for opposing our policy on this question.

It was natural that Mexico should adopt the suggestions of the shrewd diplomats of those nations, and resolve to fight it out.

There was another reason also: the Oregon dispute was then existing. Mexico, in this whole

affair, has been unfortunate. One of these misfortunes is, that this Oregon question existed at the time Mr. Slidell was sent as our minister. There is every probability he would have been received, and the dispute settled, if Mexico could have foreseen what occurred a few months afterwards; if it had not been for the idea that we were likely to be involved in war with England on account of the Oregon question, she would have listened to reasonable terms, and the controversy would have been settled in 1845. I think, then, that those who impute this war to the President of the United States, or to General Taylor's march to Rio Grande, should be very cautious how they use such a weapon.

I do not know what are the intentions or purposes of gentlemen on the other side in this matter, but I have a right to guess; and though I cannot divine their purposes, as they keep so close on the subject, if they do intend, by the position which they assumed here, to fight the battle of annexation over again, I shall not shrink from the contest, though I did think that that question had been settled, and the people believed that it had been settled. It was a question about which we differed, and which we fought manfully. One party prevailed; and I, for one, was willing to let the question rest forever. But if you throw down a gauntlet, I will not hesitate to take it up.

While on the subject of the opinions of distinguished men, I wish to refer to another opinion. I allude, sir, to Mr. Gallatin and his pamphlet on the Mexican war. He says, too, that annexation was actual war. I cannot view that document in the same light I do the speech or letter of the distinguished statesman of Kentucky. I may be wrong in this, but so it is, I differ in opinion equally from them both; but while I listen with respect and attention to one of them, the great Kentuckian, I cannot read the lucubrations of the other without indignation. And this feeling is not because I undervalue the admonitions of the aged, as the young are too apt to do; I am myself old enough to have got over that weakness, if I ever had it. I listened not long since in this body, not only with respect and attention, but almost with filial reverence, to opinions and arguments of a distinguished Senator, [Mr CALHOUN] to one not of which scarcely could I bring my mind to assent. I shall listen, whenever they speak, to other (Mr. D. here looked towards Messrs. BENTON and WEBSTER) distinguished Senators with like feelings. I feel, sir, and I believe that the people of the United States feel, that such men as I have just alluded to, have a right to speak, and ought to be listened to with profound respect on questions of national honor and of foreign war. They were born in this land, and have grown up with this country; they have done the state some service; their history, for almost half a century, is their country's history—

"The page of her story is filled with their names!" American genius has been appreciated, and American eloquence admitted and illustrated by them. Yes, sir, to such men, on all subjects, I will listen with respect, however I may differ with them. Not so, sir, with him who comes from other lands—first breathed other than American air—once owed allegiance to another Power—has another native home, and attachments, and feelings, and prejudices, and opinions, and sympathies, more or *

less influenced, as they must be, by recollections of that native home. He school Americans in American honor and national decorum! No, sir; every impulse of my heart tells me no, and compels me to say it; I cannot and will not resist it. Doubtless we have committed errors in our foreign policy; we may commit others; we should be more than human if we did not. But such as, I believe, it ever has been, under all parties, through all the vicissitudes of the most eventful period in the world's history for seventy-two years, so I hope and believe, it will continue, long after we have passed away, and when even these solid walls, that have outlived the flames of one foreign war, shall moulder to decay and fall in ruins—American in origin—the inspiration of American mind, sustained by American arms and hearts, but uninfluenced by anything that is not indigenous to our soil—foreign governments, foreign presses, foreign bayonets, foreign opinions of any, whether domiciliated at home or abroad, or anything else foreign. Yes, sir; right or wrong, successful or unsuccessful, Whig or Democratic, I want it to be American, all American, and nothing but American.

Let it not be said I am a Native American, and decry foreigners, and would deprive them of all power. Far from it! I have always taken an opposite course in all my public life on this subject; nor have I changed my opinion in the least. I stand now where I ever have on this subject, where I stood in the legislative halls of my own State when this subject was agitated in 1839, and where, on a still more memorable occasion, in the Louisiana Convention, 1844-'45, when a strong attempt was made, principally by those opposed to my party in politics, to disfranchise, in some degree, foreigners. In one of the most protracted and animated debates that I believe has ever occurred in America on the subject, I so effectually, with other Democratic friends, sustained the rights of our adopted citizens, that a meeting of the naturalized citizens of New Orleans voted medals to some half a dozen of us, at the head of which was our eloquent leader on the occasion, my good friend Bernard Marigny, who, though born in a land then foreign, has, without changing his allegiance or the ties of his native home, become an American citizen by the process of annexation; and as good a one as ever lived in it. Yes, sir, give them almost all rights, as the Federal Constitution has; but I would request only, that on questions of national honor and foreign war, they should not at least speak first and loudest, if they speak at all.

I now come to another branch of the subject, viz: the position assumed by Senators on the other side, that the President of the United States was the cause of the war; that he brought it on by the ordering the removal of the troops to the Rio Grande. I disagree totally from this opinion. My opinion is, that if this war was brought on by any cause within the control of this Government, it was produced by other hands than those of the President of the United States.

And I think an examination of the facts connected with the history of the matter will convince every impartial mind of its truth. Whether annexation was a declaration of war or not, Mexico considered it so, and made war accordingly; and the President had no option—he did not make it. Here are the facts on this point: Under date of August 23, 1843, the Mexican Minister of Foreign

Relations, in the name of his Government, addressed to our minister in Mexico the following language:

"The Mexican Government will consider equivalent to a declaration of war against the Mexican Republic the passage of an act for the incorporation of Texas with the territory of the United States, *the certainty of the fact being sufficient for the proclamation of war*, leaving to the civilized world to determine with regard to the justice of the cause of the Mexican nation in a struggle which it has been so far from provoking."

On the 12th of June, 1844, just two months after the signature by Mr. Calhoun of the treaty for the annexation of Texas, Santa Anna, then the President of Mexico, announced to the Government of the United States, "that Mexico was resolved again to undertake vigorously the campaign against Texas, for which she held in readiness a large army," and further expressed the determination of Mexico upon the point, as follows:

"That in no manner will she consent to dismember her territory—rather will she carry the war to any extreme which may be necessary to sustain her rights; and that as nations do not die, *THE RIGHT OF RECONQUERING THAT TERRITORY SHALL REMAIN TO OUR CHILDREN AND OUR GRAND-CHILDREN; THAT THIS WAS THE OPINION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND OF THE MEXICANS.*"

Santa Anna followed up this declaration by issuing in the same month (June, 1844) a requisition for thirty thousand men, and \$4,000,000, to "carry on the war against Texas." Generals Canalizo and Woll were placed in command of the force raised upon this requisition, and having advanced to Mier, on the Texan frontier, Woll, at the head of his invading army, put forth a general order under date of June 20, 1844, menacing "every individual within one league of the left bank of the Rio del Norte with the traitor's doom."

Mr. Bocanegra, then the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, styled the act of Congress providing for annexation, in his circular letter to the various European ministers then resident in Mexico, under date of May 31, 1844, "a declaration of war between the two nations."

On the 6th of March, 1845, the Mexican minister protested against the act of annexation, and demanded his passports. Our minister in Mexico was refused all intercourse with that Government, and was told, on the 2d of April, by the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs—

"That the Government of Mexico cannot continue diplomatic relations with the United States upon the presumption that such relations are reconcilable with the law which the President of the United States has approved in regard to the annexation of the department of Texas to the American Union; that this determination is founded upon the necessity which Mexico is under of maintaining no friendship with a republic which has violated her obligations, usurped a portion of territory which belongs to Mexico by a right which she will maintain at whatever cost."

On the 4th of June, 1845, President Herrera issued a proclamation, announcing the intention of Mexico to resist by arms the annexation of Texas, and affirming—

"That the law of the United States in reference to the annexation of Texas to the United States, does in nowise destroy the rights that Mexico has, and will enforce, upon that department."

Affixed to this proclamation, and published with it, were two decrees of the Mexican Congress—one setting forth that "the Mexican nation calls upon all her children to the defence of her national independence;" and the other announcing that the Government would "call to arms all the forces

of the army, according to the authority granted to it by existing laws."

On the 24th of April, 1846, Paredes issued a manifesto, expressing the determination in regard to the annexation which his Government had taken immediately upon its accession to power in the beginning of that year, and while General Taylor was still at Corpus Christi. In this manifesto, Paredes says:

"*On resuming, in the beginning of the year, the heavy responsibility of guiding the destinies of the nation during a short period, I DETERMINED RESOLUTELY TO CHANGE ITS POLICY FROM THE WEAK AND PERNICIOUS SYSTEM OF TEMPORIZING, WHICH HAS BEEN OBSERVED WITH REGARD TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PERFIDY WITH WHICH THAT GOVERNMENT PREPARED FOR THE OCCUPATION OF TEXAS, ITS TREACHEROUS VIOLATION OF THE EXISTING TREATIES WHICH GUARANTEED THE LIMITS OF THE REPUBLIC, AND THE INSIDIOUS ACT BY WHICH IT INCORPORATED ONE OF OUR DEPARTMENTS WITH ITS OWN CONFEDERACY.*

"*The old grievances, the offences against the Mexican nation, which have been incessantly repeated since 1836, had been CONSUMMATED BY THE INSULT OF SENDING US A MINISTER, TO BE ACCREDITED NEAR OUR GOVERNMENT IN THE CHARACTER OF A READING MINISTER, AS IF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO REPUBLICS HAD NOT SUFFERED ANY DISTURBANCE BY THE DEFINITE ACT OF THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS. AT THE VERY TIME WHEN MR. SLIDELL APPEARED, THE TROOPS OF THE UNITED STATES WERE OCCUPYING OUR TERRITORY.*"

In this same manifesto, issued on the 24th of April, 1846, and professing to state his policy and the grounds of it, ever since he assumed power in the beginning of the year, he further tells us, that at that time he "had sent orders to the general-in-chief of the division of our northern frontier, to act in hostility against the army which is in hostility against us," &c.

On the 4th of October, 1845, General Taylor advised the march to the Rio Grande, in these words :

"For these reasons, our position thus far has, I think, been the best possible; but, now that the entire force will soon be concentrated, it may well be a question whether the views of Government will be best carried out by our remaining at this point. It is with great deference that I make any suggestions on topics which may become matter of delicate negotiation; but if our Government, in settling the question of boundary, makes the line of the Rio Grande an ultimatum, I cannot doubt that the settlement will be greatly facilitated and hastened by our taking possession at once of one or two suitable points on or quite near the river. Our strength and state of preparation should be displayed in a manner not to be mistaken. However salutary may be the effect produced upon the border people by our presence here, we are too far from the frontier to impress the Government of Mexico with our readiness to vindicate, by force of arms, if necessary, our title to the country as far as the Rio Grande. The 'army of occupation' will, in a few days, be concentrated at this point, in condition for vigorous and efficient service. Mexico having as yet made no positive declaration of war, or committed any overt act of hostilities, I do not feel at liberty, under my instructions, particularly those of July 8, to make a forward movement to the Rio Grande without authority from the War Department.

"In case a forward movement should be ordered or authorized, I would recommend the occupation of Point Isabel and Laredo as best adapted to the purposes of observing the course of the river and covering the frontier settlements of Texas."

On the 13th of January, 1846, orders were issued in conformity with this suggestion, but carefully guarding against war, in these words:

"*WAR DEPARTMENT,*
"Washington, January 13, 1846.
"SIR: I am directed by the President to instruct you to advance and occupy, with the troops under your command, positions on or near the east bank of the Rio del Norte, as soon as it can be conveniently done, with reference to the season and the routes by which your movements must be made. From the views heretofore presented to this department, it is presumed Point Isabel will be considered by you an eligible position. This point, or some one near it, and points opposite Matamoras and Mier, and in the vicinity of

Laredo, are suggested for your consideration; but you are left to your better knowledge to determine the post or posts which you are to occupy, as well as the question of dividing your forces with a view to occupying two or more positions.

"In the positions you may take in carrying out these instructions and other movements that may be made, the use of the Del Norte may be very convenient, if not necessary. Should you attempt to exercise the right which the United States have in common with Mexico to the free navigation of this river, it is probable that Mexico would interpose resistance. You will not attempt to enforce this right without further instructions.

"It is not designed, in our present relations with Mexico, that you should treat her as an enemy; but, should she assume that character by a declaration of war, or any open act of hostility towards us, you will not act merely on the defensive, if your relative means enable you to do otherwise."

These orders were received on the 4th of February, 1846, and were executed according to their spirit, as the despatch of 16th February shows:

"I have taken occasion to represent to some citizens of Matamoros, who were here with a large number of mules for sale, and who are represented to have considerable influence at home, that the United States Government, in occupying the Rio Grande, has no motive of hostility towards Mexico, and that the army will, in no case, go beyond the river, unless hostilities should be commenced by the Mexicans themselves; that the Mexicans living on this side will not be disturbed in any way by the troops; that they will be protected in all their rights and usages; and that everything which the army may need will be purchased from them at fair prices. I also stated, that until the matter should be finally adjusted between the two Governments, the harbor of Brazos Santiago would be open to the free use of the Mexicans as heretofore. The same views were impressed upon the Mexican custom-house officer at Brazos Santiago, by Captain Hardee, who commanded the escort which covered the reconnaissance of Padre Island."

On the 11th March, the army marched from Corpus Christi; and on the 24th, General Taylor, with a part of his command, arrived at Point Isabel; and on the 28th, he arrived with the main body on the bank of the Rio Grande opposite Matamoros. Here I will read from the minutes of the interview between Generals Worth and La Vega on the same day, showing his refusal to allow him communication with our consul:

"Gen. Worth.—Is the American consul in arrest, or in prison?

Gen. La Vega.—No.

Gen. Worth.—Is he now in the exercise of his proper functions?

Gen. La Vega, after apparently consulting with the Licenciado Casares for a moment, replied that he was.

Gen. Worth.—Then, as an American officer, in the name of my Government and my commanding general, I demand an interview with the consul of my country.

(No reply.)

Gen. Worth.—Has Mexico declared war against the United States?

Gen. La Vega.—No.

Gen. Worth.—Are the two countries still at peace?

Gen. La Vega.—Yes.

Gen. Worth.—Then I again demand an interview with the consul of my Government, in Matamoros, in the presence, of course, of these gentlemen, or any other that the commanding general in Matamoros may be pleased to designate.

General La Vega reiterated that the consul was in the proper exercise of his functions; that he was not in arrest, nor were any other Americans in arrest at Matamoros; that he would submit the demand to General Mejia, adding that he thought there would be great difficulty.

This demand was repeatedly made in the most emphatic manner, and a reply requested; General La Vega stating the consul continued in the exercise of his functions, and that General Worth's demand would be submitted to General Mejia.

No reply having been received from General La Vega relative to the demand for an interview with the American consul, the question was again introduced by General Worth, and the demand for the last time reiterated.

General La Vega then promptly refused to comply with the demand, replying, without waiting for the interpretation, "No, no."

Gen. Worth.—I have now to state that a refusal of my demand to see the American consul is regarded as a belliger-

ent act; and, in conclusion, I have to add, the commanding general of the American forces on the left bank of the river will regard the passage of any armed party of Mexicans in hostile array across the Rio Grande as an act of war, and pursue it accordingly."

General Ampudia arrived at Matamoros on the 11th April, and on the 12th addressed this letter to General Taylor, "by explicit and definitive orders, from my [his] Government:"

"Your Government, in an incredible manner—you will even permit me to say an extravagant one, if the usage or general rules established and received among all civilized nations are regarded—has not only insulted, but has exasperated the Mexican nation, bearing its conquering banner to the left bank of the Rio Bravo del Norte; and in this case, by explicit and definite orders of my Government, which neither can, will, nor should receive new outrages, I require you in all form, and at latest in the peremptory term of twenty four hours, to break up your camp and retire to the other bank of the Nueces river, while our Governments are regulating the pending question in relation to Texas. If you insist in remaining upon the soil of the department of Tamaulipas, it will clearly result that arms, and arms alone, must decide the question; and in that case, I advise you that we accept the war to which, with so much injustice on your part, you provoke us, and that, on our part, this war shall be conducted conformably to the principles established by the most civilized nations; that is to say, that the law of nations and of war shall be the guide of my operations, trusting that on your part the same will be observed.

"With this view, I tender you the considerations due to your person and respectable office.

"God and Liberty!

"HEADQUARTERS AT MATAMOROS,

2 o'clock, p. m., April 12, 1846.

"PEDRO D'AMPUDIA.

"Senior General-in-Chief of the
United States Army, DON Z. TAYLOR."

General Taylor's Answer.

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,
Camp near Matamoros, Texas, April 12, 1846. }

"SEÑOR: I have had the honor to receive your note of this date, in which you summon me to withdraw the forces under my command from their present position, and beyond the river Nueces, until the pending questions between our Governments, relative to the limits of Texas, shall be settled. I need hardly advise you, that, charged as I am, in only a military capacity, with the performance of specific duties, I cannot enter into a discussion of the international question involved in the advance of the American army.

"The instructions under which I am acting will not permit me to retrograde from the position I now occupy. In view of the relations between our respective Governments, and the individual suffering which may result, I regret the alternative which you offer; but, at the same time, wish it understood that I shall by no means avoid such alternative, leaving the responsibility with those who rashly commence hostilities.

"Señor General D. PEDRO DE AMPUDIA."

On the 15th of that month, considering this an act of war, General Taylor blockaded the mouth of the Rio Grande. This is his report:

"In my last despatch I advised you, that on receipt of General Ampudia's summons to fall back from my position, I ordered a blockade of the mouth of the Rio Grande, deeming this measure perfectly proper under the circumstances, and, at the same time, the most efficient means of letting the Mexican commander understand that this state of *quasi* war was not to be interpreted to his advantage only, while we reaped the inconveniences attending it. On the 17th instant, pursuant to my instructions, Lieutenant Renshaw, of the navy, warned off two American schooners about to enter the river with provisions. Yesterday, I received from General Ampudia a communication on the subject, a translation of which, and my reply, are herewith transmitted. I trust that my course in this matter will meet the approval of the department. It will, at any rate, compel the Mexicans to withdraw their army from Matamoros, where it cannot be subsisted, or to assume the offensive on this side of the river."

Ampudia's reply.

"DIVISION OF THE NORTHE, Second General in Chief.

"From various sources worthy of confidence, I have learned that some vessels, bound for the mouth of the river, have not been able to effect an entrance into that port, in

consequence of your orders that they should be conducted to Brazos Santiago. The cargo of one of them is composed in great part, and of the other entirely, of provisions, which the contractors, charged with providing for the army under my orders, had procured, to fulfil the obligations of their contracts. You have taken possession of these provisions by force, and against the will of the proprietors, one of whom is vice consul of her Catholic Majesty, and the other of her Britannic Majesty; and whose rights, in place of being religiously respected, as was proffered, and as was to be hoped from the observance of the principles which govern among civilized nations, have, on the contrary, been violated in the most extraordinary manner, opposed to the guarantee and respect due to private property."

On the 16th of April, General Ampudia recognized a state of war, in his letter concerning Colonel Cross, in these terms:

"In reply to your note which I received yesterday, I have the honor to state, that if Colonel Cross, Quartermaster General of the forces under your command, had been found at any of the military posts under my orders, his lot would have been that of a prisoner of war, treated with the consideration due his rank, and according to the rules prescribed by the law of nations and of war, well considered in his situation as a prisoner."

On the 24th of April, General Arista arrived, assumed the command, and notified General Taylor of the existence of war; and on the same day, giving the word and the blow at the same time, Captain Thornton and his command were attacked and defeated, as the following despatch will show:

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,
"Camp near Matamoros, Texas, April 26, 1846."

"SIR: I have respectfully to report, that General Arista arrived in Matamoros on the 24th instant, and assumed the chief command of the Mexican troops. On the same day he addressed me a communication, conceived in courteous terms, but saying that he considered hostilities commenced, and should prosecute them. A translation of his note and a copy of my reply will be transmitted the moment they can be prepared. I despatch this by an express which is now waiting.

"I regret to report that a party of dragoons, sent out by me on the 24th instant to watch the course of the river above on this bank, became engaged with a very large force of the enemy, and after a short affair, in which some sixteen were killed and wounded, appear to have been surrounded, and compelled to surrender. Not one of the party has returned, except a wounded man, sent in this morning by the Mexican commander, so that I cannot report with confidence the particulars of the engagement, or the fate of the officers, except that Captain Hardee was known to be a prisoner, and unhurt. Captain Thornton and Lieutenants Mason and Kane were the other officers. The party was sixty-three strong."

Next comes General Taylor's letter to Ampudia, of the 22d of April, explaining his course up to this time.

"On breaking up my camp at Corpus Christi, and moving forward with the army under my orders to occupy the left bank of the Rio Bravo, it was my earnest desire to execute my instructions in a pacific manner; to observe the utmost regard for the personal rights of all citizens residing on the left bank of the river, and to take care that the religion and customs of the people should suffer no violation. With this view, and to quiet the minds of the inhabitants, I issued orders to the army, enjoining a strict observance of the rights and interests of all Mexicans residing on the river, and caused said orders to be translated into Spanish, and circulated in the several towns on the Bravo. These orders announced the spirit in which we proposed to occupy the country, and I am proud to say that up to this moment the same spirit has controlled the operations of the army. On reaching the Arroyo Colorado, I was informed by a Mexican officer that the order in question had been received at Matamoros; but was told at the same time that if I attempted to cross the river, it would be regarded as a declaration of war. Again, on my march to Frontone I was met by a deputation of the civil authorities of Matamoros, protesting against my occupation of a portion of the territory of Tamaulipas, and declaring that if the army was not at once withdrawn, war would result. While this communication was in my hands, it was discovered that the village of Frontone had been set on fire and abandoned. I viewed this as a direct act of war, and informed the deputation that their

communication would be answered by me when opposite Matamoros, which was done in respectful terms. On reaching the river, I despatched an officer, high in rank, to convey to the commanding general in Matamoros the expression of my desire for amicable relations, and my willingness to leave open to the use of the citizens of Matamoros the port of Brazos Santiago, until the question of boundary should be definitely settled. This officer received for reply, from the officer selected to confer with him, that my advance to the Rio Bravo was considered as a veritable act of war; and he was absolutely refused an interview with the American consul, in itself an act incompatible with a state of peace. Notwithstanding these repeated assurances on the part of the Mexican authorities, and notwithstanding the most obviously hostile preparations on the right bank of the river, accompanied by a rigid non-intercourse, I carefully abstained from any act of hostility—determined that the onus of producing an actual state of hostilities should not rest with me. Our relations remained in this state until I had the honor to receive your note of the 12th instant, in which you denounce war as the alternative of my remaining in this position. As I could not, under my instructions, recede from my position, I accepted the alternative you offered, and made all my dispositions to meet it suitably. But, still willing to adopt milder measures before proceeding to others, I contented myself, in the first instance, with ordering a blockade of the mouth of the Rio Bravo by the naval forces under my orders—a proceeding perfectly consonant with the state of war so often declared to exist, and which you acknowledge in your note of the 16th instant, relative to the late Colonel Cross. If this measure seem oppressive, I wish it borne in mind that it has been forced upon me by the course you have seen fit to adopt. I have reported this blockade to my Government, and shall not remove it until I receive instructions to that effect, unless, indeed, you desire an armistice, pending the final settlement of the question between the Governments, or until war shall be formally declared by either; in which case, I will cheerfully open the river. In regard to the consequences you mention as resulting from a refusal to remove the blockade, I beg you to understand that I am prepared for them, be they what they may.

"In conclusion, I take leave to state, that I consider the tone of your communication highly exceptional, where you stigmatize the movement of the army under my orders as 'marked with the seal of universal reprobation.' You must be aware that such language is not respectful in itself, either to me or my Government; and while I observe in my own correspondence the courtesy due to your high position, and to the magnitude of the interests with which we are respectively charged, I shall expect the same in return."

No volunteers were called for except two companies from Texas until the 26th of April, though full authority had already been given for the same. See despatch of that day:

"Hostilities may now be considered as commenced, and I have this day deemed it necessary to call upon the Governor of Texas for four regiments of volunteers, two to be mounted and two to serve as foot. As some delay must occur in collecting these troops, I have also desired the Governor of Louisiana to send out four regiments of infantry as soon as practicable. This will constitute an auxiliary force of nearly five thousand men, which will be required to prosecute the war with energy, and carry it, as it should be, into the enemy's country. I trust the department will approve my course in this matter, and will give the necessary orders to the staff departments for the supply of this large additional force."

From these facts, I think it results clearly that the war did not commence by the act of the President; that it was commenced by Mexico, as she had determined from the first, and that nothing would have prevented it, sooner or later. But if there was any cause which brought on the crisis at this particular time, it was, first, the blockade of the mouth of the Rio Grande, which, in the language of General Taylor, must necessarily compel the Mexicans either to retreat or to cross the river and fight him; and, secondly, the failure of that general to call for volunteers, as he was authorized to do, after he arrived on the Rio Grande, and was informed of the hostile intentions of the Mexicans. He arrived there nearly a month before the attack on Captain Thornton, and if he had then called on Texas and Louisiana for volun-

teers, the rapidity with which they flew to his assistance afterwards shows that they might have arrived at the scene of action before the 24th of April. It can hardly be supposed if two or three thousand additional troops had been with General Taylor that the Mexicans would have crossed the river. These events occurred without the knowledge of the President of the United States, and before the facts could be communicated to him and any order given. No orders or authority was ever given to blockade the mouth of the river; on the contrary, General Taylor was instructed not to insist on the joint navigation of that river if it should be objected to by the Mexicans. General Taylor was repeatedly reminded of the ample authority given him to call for volunteers, and he, and not the President, was the best judge of what was necessary. He had a generous confidence in his army, that it was able to withstand the force which the Mexicans could bring against it, and subsequent events have proved that he was correct. But the Mexicans did not know it at that time. They had no idea of our prowess; but I do not think they would have crossed the river against a large force.

I do not blame General Taylor for the course he adopted. It may have precipitated the war a little sooner than it would otherwise have occurred; but still, as it must have occurred at last, and as we made a glorious beginning on the fields of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, I see no cause to regret it. All I wish to say is, that for these events the President of the United States is not responsible.

Before I close, there is another fact which I wish

to submit to the consideration of the Senate. Those on the other side of the House contend that the President brought on the war by ordering the army to the Rio Grande, a territory either belonging to Mexico, or in dispute. Whatever difference of opinion may exist on the question of boundary, it was clearly the duty of the President to recognize the Rio Grande as the true boundary. Acts of Congress had recognized it as such; they were the laws of the land, and he was bound to obey them, whatever opinions may have been entertained by the Mexican Government, or others, on the question of boundary. That he was right in considering this American territory, and the Mexican troops as invading it, is clearly proved by the proceedings of this body, on the 12th of May, 1846, when the bill recognizing the war was under consideration. I will here extract from the Journal of the Senate:

"On motion by Mr. CARRINGTON, to amend the bill by striking out, section 1, line 4, the words 'to prosecute said war to a speedy and successful termination,' and in lieu thereof insert, 'to repel invasion, and otherwise prosecute hostilities, until the country be secured from the danger of further invasion.'"

This was determined in the negative—yeas 20, nays 26. How can it be contended, after this, that the President made this war, or that it was not made on American soil? How could the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CARRINGTON] call it "invasion," unless the Mexican army had crossed over into American soil. He, and they who voted with him, must have so considered it at the time. How can they, then, say now that the President made this war?

APPENDIX.

In consequence of the recommendation of our friends generally in the Senate last week, that after that time, during the debate on the ten-regiment bill, no member should occupy the floor more than one day, I had not time, without continuing the session to an unusually late hour, to discuss a few other points which I had intended to embrace in my speech. Having, however, previously collected some facts and documents on these points which I think may be useful, I submit them here, as an appendix.

In reply to the charge of the Senator from Delaware, [Mr. CLAYTON,] that it would be dishonesty, and amount to robbery, to take by conquest territory from Mexico, I submit the following documents, to show that neither the law of nations nor the practice of nations is in conformity with the position which he assumes. Foreign nations, and even England, the most grasping and the most watchful and jealous of them all, not only looks on this conquest of Mexico as an event likely to happen, and not contrary to the law of nations, but a thing desirable in itself, and advantageous to the whole world. Here is what the press of England, the most talented and the most influential in the world, and often, in an informal and unofficial form, showing the opinions of the Government, says upon the subject:

No. 1.—PUBLIC OPINION ABROAD AS TO OUR CONQUEST OF MEXICO.

[From a British paper by last steamer, January, 1848.]

Policy of Mr. Clay and the Whigs.

"The policy of the Union with regard to Mexico seems to be the question on which the rival-

parties are preparing to try each other's strength. The declarations made on this topic—as yet all on the Whig side—may be taken as an index of the national wishes. Mr. Clay has unreservedly declared against the Mexican war, and against all territorial acquisition by its means. This profession has been favorably received by the section of public opinion in the United States which corresponds to Exeter Hall in this country; but the real Whig party demurs to it. The wary practical leaders of the party, indeed, to avoid the danger of schism in their ranks, profess to adopt Mr. Clay's manifesto, only with a modification. They ask no territorial acquisition beyond a narrow slip of land along the Pacific, to connect the harbor of San Fernando* with Oregon, and incorporate the port into the American territory. But some more fiery spirits declare against this attempt at compromise, vow that Mr. Clay must be thrown overboard, and go over to General Scott. It seems pretty clear that Mr. Clay has overshot the mark; that his Quaker policy will not go down with the electors of the United States."

Also, by the last steamer, same London paper, on the war and acquisition of territory says:

"The dog-in-the-manger character of the tenacious grasp laid upon Texas by Mexico soon became apparent. The Mexicans, unable to colonize Texas, invited citizens of the United States to do it for them. The calculation of the Mexicans was, that American energy would do what they could

*Intended for San Francisco.

not—render available the natural wealth of Texas—and that the thriving Yankee settlers would remain contented subjects and tributaries of Mexico. In this belief, the Government at Mexico began rather too soon to apply, to the sturdy settlers it had called in, the measure of justice it had been in the habit of applying to its Spanish and Indian populations. The result was an insurrection, in the course of which the almost exclusively Anglo-American population of Texas emancipated itself from all dependance on, or connection with, the Central Government in Mexico. Texas was recognized as an independent State by France and England. Now the time had come for which the government at Washington, as representative of the American people, had so patiently waited. Texas, free from former ties, was at liberty, in virtue of its independence, to contract new. Its adult citizens had, almost to a man, been born citizens of the United States; they were naturally desirous of relapsing into their old character; and Texas was incorporated into the Union.

"Still, Mexico had not recognized the independence of Texas, and dreams of reannexing it to the republic had not ceased to haunt its rulers. Though warned by the Government at Washington that Texas, having now become an integral part of the United States, would be defended by the troops of the Union against any foreign invasion, the Mexican authorities levied troops and concentrated them in the direction of the Texan frontier. The predisposition on both sides to decide the disputed right to the soil of Texas by arms, was stimulated by a whole host of grievances, more or less real, on both sides. Mexicans and Americans were alike eager for war, and war was inevitable; which party was demonstrably the aggressor, may be left to the pedants of diplomacy to decide.

"In this war the Mexicans have been beaten at all hands, in a wonderfully short time, with seemingly most inadequate means; the Americans have made themselves masters of four northern States of the Mexican Union, of all the Mexican seaboard on the Gulf of Mexico, and of the capital of the republic. The Mexican armies have been again and again beaten and broken up. There is no real Mexican government. The Americans—conquerors in a regular war—are, by all the laws of Grotius, entitled to dictate the terms of peace. They have fought well, and they have fought fairly. Had they not obtained a final and unequivocal recognition of their sovereignty in Oregon, policy would have taught them to be contented with the frontier of the Rio Grande. But, as sovereigns of Oregon, the annexation of San Fernando is an object to them; they hold, and can continue to hold, that harbor and the intervening territory towards their frontier; and there can be little doubt that they will exact this cession, at least, on the part of Mexico, as a compensation for the expenses the war has entailed upon them.

"We do not take upon us to say that there has been nothing in the conduct of the United States, throughout these transactions, of which Mexico has not cause to complain; but we could show that Mexico has repeatedly given just cause of complaint to the United States. And Mexico, in the willful ignorance of vanity, has provoked a collision with a power far its overmatch in strength. Even yet, though drubbed in a manner of which women might be ashamed, the rulers of Mexico (if any there be) appear unaware of how entirely

they have been beaten. They seem not disinclined to protract indefinitely, not a struggle, but the settlement of a definitive peace. And the consequence of this folly can only be the exactation of still heavier concessions by their antagonists.

"The Mexicans have their own want of prudence and energy to thank for the scrape they have got into. That the United States are resolved to turn the blunders of their rivals to account, may not square with the dictates of an ideal morality; but, for proposing to retain their hold upon the northern part of California, where is the State entitled to throw the first stone at them? Not France, while it retains the Palatinat on one hand, and Algeria on the other; not Prussia, while it holds fast the Saxon province; not Russia, while it reigns at Warsaw; not England, while it retains half its colonies, to say nothing of India. It is ridiculous the attempt to make that a crime on the part of the Government at Washington, which, in the case of European Governments, is allowed to be the inevitable consequence of the more powerful nation, in all cases of international quarrel, being obliged to be judge in its own cause.

"This is the light in which the question is viewed by an immense majority of the practical influential statesmen of the North American Union, and the successful candidate for the Presidency will be the man who is prepared to act up to it. That the victories gained by the Americans in Mexico will be a source of advantage to their Republic, may be questioned. It is more than doubtful whether they will be able to relinquish their hold of any part of the Mexican territory; and if they cannot, Mexico is likely to prove their Ireland. But they have gone too far to recede, without, however, having done anything to justify that virtuous indignation which would write the annals of the Mexican war like a romance, with the American Union for the unmitigated villain of the story, and the Mexican Republic for the suffering saint."

[From another English paper.]

"That the United States will retain the greater part of the wealthy possessions they have conquered, or perhaps relax their hold for a time, (*reculer pour mieux sauter*), with a view to their more complete ultimate absorption, does not admit, in our minds, of a reasonable doubt. There has been raised, it is true, a half menacing cry—raised during the current week by the leading journals to which we commenced by referring—against the unjust progress of American aggrandizement. But, looking to our first occupation of Eastern India, and our progress there afterwards, the less we say on the subject of the similar occupation by our American brethren of Western India the better. Again: can we vindicate our more recent sanguinary war with the Chinese—a *weaker* people, like the Mexicans—because they declined to take our opium poison, and in order that our now collapsing 'merchant princes' might thrive by forcing that poison down their throats at the point of the bayonet? * * * * * General Scott (whose triumph, in romantic splendor, stands second only to that of Cortez, and, in some respects, eclipses those of Napoleon) * * * Do we, then, regret the conquest of Mexico by the United States? By no means. Both with regard to India and to China, our statesmen refer, as an ordinary common-place, in debate, and justly—so certainly does Providence, in spite of the

unjust, evoke good and retribution combined out of the very bosom of injustice—to the resulting benefits of commercial civilization, and the triumph of reason and law over superstition and idolatry. We have more solemn views of the results which this most splendid conquest is likely to produce on the future destinies of the human species. There are "signs in the times"—independent of the greatest of revolutions effected by the magic of steam—that the "old things" of European diplomacy, founded, as Voltaire truly said, on "systematic falsehood," are effete and obsolete, and that the "new things are come;" and we are, further, of opinion that the conquest of Mexico by the United States will advance with the most efficacious and desirable rapidity that paramount, unrivalled, vital, and sacred cause of the universal brotherhood and holy commonwealth of Christian civilization, for the advent of which we daily pray. Compared with that, all other arguments and all other results shrink into pigmy littleness, and dwarf themselves into comparative contempt."

No. 2.

ANNEXATION OF ALL MEXICO.

The Senator from Delaware [Mr. CLAYTON] said :

"But, sir, we are rapidly approaching that state of things which will make the conquest and annexation of all Mexico inevitable; and these bills are a part of the process by which, if they become laws, we shall, in my humble judgment, be driven to this result."

If we are driven to take all Mexico, as is here charged, it will be by the folly of the rulers of that country and the extraordinary encouragement they have received from some of our own public men and citizens. We (the President and the Democratic party) do not desire to take all Mexico; but events may force it upon us; and if this should be the case, let the following extracts from the Picayune of January 8, 1848, (a neutral paper, though edited by Whigs,) be our explanation and excuse. The principal editors of this paper are Mr. Kendall (a Whig, and a gentleman who has seen more and knows more and has written more of Mexico and Mexicans than any other American) and A. C. Bullitt, Esq., also a Whig from Kentucky, formerly the editor of the leading Whig paper in New Orleans—the "Bee"—and who was in the last, and is now in the present, Legislature of Louisiana, a leading Whig member. Here is what is said in that paper; read, and ponder on it, all, but especially Whigs, who oppose a vigorous prosecution of the war:

From the N. O. Picayune, January 8, 1848.

"It is in no spirit of querulousness that the mistakes of the past are cited, in view of the new line of policy adopted, but in justification of a change in the strategy of war, which is the beginning of an end that is shrouded in darkness. 'The army is about to spread itself over and to occupy the Republic of Mexico.' It is about to establish civil government, to a certain extent—to levy and collect taxes—to lay and enforce imposts—to regulate commerce between the different States—to reform the administration of public affairs, and, indeed, do such other acts as pertain to the powers of an organized and established State. What this condition of things will lead to, what it ought to lead to in the end, will depend more upon the course Mexico and Mexicans may pursue than

upon any fixed purpose in this country to blot her out of the list of nations. The United States Government can scarcely do less than they are now doing, and the people of this country will not be held accountable for the consequences of a career forced upon them by the foolhardiness of another. At any time since the beginning of the war it has been in the power of Mexico to secure her nationality, by making or listening to overtures of peace; and even now terms which would leave her sovereignty over a larger domain than she can rule, intact, would be embraced with alacrity by the authorities of the United States. But what will become of her if she pause till the army stretch its arms to all places of her pride, and lay its hands upon all the towers of her strength? And what yet if the infatuation of her chiefs detain the military governments of the United States in their midst till the better order of Mexicans claim the protection of a power whose martial law is milder in enforcing order than the governments they have been accustomed to were in failing to do so? The army is about to spread itself over and occupy Mexico till the Mexican Republic shall sue for peace in terms acceptable to the United States. When will that be? What indications are there that it will ever be? It is the misfortune of Mexico that those who would serve her do her harm—those who in this country (and they are among the greatest and best of the land) would not take an inch of her territory, but keep the issue open. Whilst Congress is debating and statesmen building up theories, and politicians fingering the public pulse, the 'army is spreading itself over,' and whilst the agitation of topics connected with the war is kept up, it is 'occupying the Republic of Mexico.' The energies, enterprise, and willfulness, so to speak, of a bolder and a superior race are permeating the hills and valleys of the overrun Republic. Nor is it prophetic of the long dominion of a hybrid people to have their flowers scented by any of Saxon origin. We may condemn, we may argue against the tendencies of a race of men of higher organization, bolder hearts, more enterprising minds, of superior thaws and muscles, and stouter wills, to supplant weak and emasculated tribes—good authority can be evoked to show how wrong all this is—homilies to this day are written against the pilgrim fathers for ejecting the savages from the primeval forests of the north—but until the eloquence of ethics can melt human nature and mould it anew, we apprehend the world will wag on much after the old fashion. No scrap of philosophy, nor moral essay nor political disquisition can countervail the dangerous odor of fields, in perennial blossom, to an army of Anglo Saxons."

Read also this extract of a letter recently received by me from a distinguished officer in the American army, which was published in the Delta.

We ought to decide what we intend to annex, to satisfy and secure the safety of the people who reside there:

"The well-disposed and most intelligent of the Mexican people are now holding out their hands in abject terror, and supplicating the protection which our country alone can give.

"It is no secret in Mexico, that vast numbers of the best portion of her inhabitants are willing and ready to declare in favor of American suprem-

acy, but are deterred from such a measure only by the uncertainty which characterizes our operations in that country, and the apprehension that a treaty of peace, and the withdrawal of our armies, will leave them exposed to the most fearful consequences; and it is well known that the deadly ban of the 'triple cross' has already been placed opposite the names of many of the best citizens in Mexico, in consequence of their friendship and intercourse with our countrymen, and the expressions of kindness and confidence in which they have indulged towards them.

"As an illustration of this fact, it is known that on a late occasion, when a benefit was given by the Americans to a distinguished actress in the city of Mexico, agents were sent from the present Mexican seat of Government, (Queretaro,) and every Mexican family who attended that benefit, was marked for future punishment.

"There exists, therefore, a moral obligation on the part of our country to protect the large number of virtuous and intelligent citizens of Mexico, who, mourning over the evils which have so long devastated their country, and appreciating the superiority of our real republican form of Government, have cast in their lot with our armies, and hailed their advent into Mexico as the precursor of a better system, the harbinger of better times. And these are the best people in Mexico. To abandon them now to the tender mercies of the demi-savages who surround them, would be inconsistent with the spirit of philanthropy with which we have professed to be animated in the conduct of this war."

No. 3.

POPULATION AND TERRITORY OF MEXICO.

Again, Mr. CLAYTON says:

"What will be the consequence of the annexation of twenty Mexican States to the American Union? Of all men in the United States the most interested in making this inquiry solemnly, and examining it patiently and carefully, are the gentlemen of the South. There are in Mexico not less than eight millions of human beings, men, women, and children, of a race totally different from ourselves—a colored population, having no feelings in common with us—no prejudices like ours; but, on the contrary, with prejudices directly the antipodes of all of ours, and especially bigoted on this very subject of slavery."

The idea of the colored population of Mexico (the Indians) being abolitionists, and overthrowing slavery, is a most original idea, certainly. Who ever heard of an Indian being an abolitionist? They are the last people in the world to think of or act on such a subject. Many of them (the Peons) are in a worse condition of slavery than our negroes, and would be happy to change places with them.

As to the "twenty Mexican States" and "eight millions of human beings," examine the following statistics:

[From Mayer's Mexico.]

"According to the best authorities, the territory of the Mexican Republic contains an area of 1,650,000 square miles, and the United States of America 2,300,000. If we allow, as is calculated, that the square mile will contain, under ordinary careful cultivation, a population of two hundred persons, we shall have the sum of 330,000,000 for the total ultimate capability of the Mexican soil, and 460,000,000 for the United States—or 130,000,000 less in Mexico than in our Union.

"Another estimate, in 1839, reduces the sum

to 7,065,000, and gives eight inhabitants to the square mile; but the most complete, and probably the most accurate, of the recent calculations, is the one which was made by the Government itself, (without special enumeration,) and served as a basis for the call of a Congress to form a new constitution, under the plan of Tacubaya, in 1842:

Departments.	Population.
Mexico	1,389,520
Jalisco.....	679,311
Puebla.....	661,903
Yucatan	580,948
Guanajuato	512,606
Oaxaca.....	500,978
Michoacan.....	497,906
San Luis Potosi	321,840
Zacatecas	273,575
Vera Cruz.....	254,380
Durango.....	162,618
Chihuahua.....	147,600
Sinaloa	147,000
Chiapas.....	141,206
Sonora.....	134,000
Queretaro.....	120,560
Nuevo Leon	101,108
Tamaulipas	100,068
Coahuila.....	75,340
Aguas Calientes	69,698
Tabasco.....	63,580
Nuevo Mexico.....	57,026
Californias.....	33,439
Total in 1842.....	7,015,509

"I am, however, by no means satisfied that the estimates of both Poinsett and Burkhardt are not too high; yet, assuming the statements of 1842 and of 1793 to be nearly accurate, we find in forty-nine years an increase of only 1,774,111 in the entire population. Again, if we assume the population to have been 6,000,000 in 1824, (the year, in fact, of the establishment of the Republic,) we find that in the course of eighteen years of liberty and independence, the increase has not been greater than 1,044,140.

"In the United States of America, with only 650,000 more of square miles of territory now, and not so large a space at the achievement of our independence, the increase of our population during the first twenty years of freedom cannot have been less than two millions and a half, while, in the course of the last thirty years, it has averaged an increase of rather more than 33 per cent. every ten.

"The several castes and classes of Mexicans may be rated in the following manner:

Indians.....	4,000,000
Whites.....	1,000,000
Negroes.....	6,000
All other castes, such as Zambos, Meestizos, Mulattoes, &c.....	2,000,509

7,015,509

"It appears, therefore, that the Indians and negroes amount to 4,006,000, and the whites and all other castes to 3,009,509. A very respectable and aged resident of Mexico, who is remarkable for the extent and accuracy of his observations, estimates that of the former, (or negroes and Indians,) but two per cent. can read and write; while of the latter, at a liberal estimate, but about twenty per cent. If we take this computation to be correct, as I believe from my own observation it is, and using the estimate of the decree of 1842 for the basis of the population, we shall have—

Of Indians and negroes who can read and write.... 80,190
Of whites and all others 607,698

Total able to read and write out of a population of 7,000,000..... 687,748

"This would appear to be a startling fact, in a Republic the basis of whose safety is the capacity of the people for an intellectual self-government.

"Let us, however, carry this calculation a little further. If we suppose that out of the one million of whites, five hundred thousand, or the half only, are males, and of that half million but twenty per cent., or but one hundred thousand, can read and write, we will no longer be surprised that a population of more than seven millions has been hitherto controlled by a handful of men; or that, with the small means of improvement afforded to the few who can read, the selfish natures of the superior classes, who wield the physical and intellectual forces of the nation, have forced the masses to become little more than the slaves of those whose wit gives them the talent of control.

"In addition to this, you will observe how little has been done hitherto for the cause of learning by the Government, when you examine a table of the expenses of the nation, by which it will be seen, that in the year 1840, while \$180,000 were spent for hospitals, fortresses, and prisons, and \$8,000,000 for the army, (without foreign war,) only \$110,000 were given to all the institutions of learning in Mexico."

And if you consider, that of this 100,000 males who can read and write, 40,000 are soldiers, about one-half of these being officers and 200 of them generals, (as Waddy Thompson states in his book,) how deplorable must be the situation of that country! And how can they be injured by change of rulers, or by passing under the jurisdiction of the United States?

Here is the way Mr. Thompson tells us they enlist their soldiers:

"The soldiers of the Mexican army are generally collected by sending out recruiting detachments into the mountains, where they hunt the Indians in their dens and caverns, and bring them in chains to Mexico; droves are seen daily."

From the foregoing table of population, it appears that—

New Leon contains a population of.....	101,108
Tamaulipas.....	100,068
Coahuila.....	75,340
New Mexico.....	57,026
Californias.....	33,439
Making in all in these States.....	366,981

One-seventh of which is.....Whites, 52,425 and taking one-seventh of 90,466, which is the population of New Mexico and the Californias, gives a white population of those last-named States of 11,637.

This is the population to the boundary of what is called the Sierra Madre, and (containing, I think, 52,000 whites, and as many Indians as you please) could not injure us much. Most certainly, 90,000 "beings" (as an honorable Senator calls them) in the Californias and New Mexico, of which only 11,000 are whites, all the President in his message seems to think we want, could not "ruin" us much.

This calculation of whites and Indians in the States above-named is made on the ratio given by the writer, of one white person to every seven Indians or mixed bloods, which is the ratio in Mexico at large; but there is strong reason to believe that these States, being more recently and much more sparsely settled by Europeans and Spaniards, and also from the well-known fact, that in this quarter of Mexico the Indians have encroached

upon and broken up many of the settlements of the Spaniards, that there is a much larger proportion of Indians than in other parts of Mexico.

I think, then, it may be safely assumed, that in these six States there is a population of not more than fifty thousand white persons, and in New Mexico and the two Californias not more than ten thousand. And if we take one-fifth of these numbers as the ratio of those who can read and write—which is the ratio given by the author for the white population in Mexico generally—it will give ten thousand who can read and write in the three first States, and two thousand in New Mexico and the Californias.

No. 4.

TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH MEXICO.

"Our citizens have been imprisoned in Mexico on frivolous pretences. Forced loans have been wrested from our merchants. Tribunals have been deaf to demands for restitution, and a mutual distrust has arisen, which has proved fatal in many instances to trade and intercourse. The effects of this will, however, be most strikingly exhibited in the following table, compiled chiefly from the reports of the Secretary of our national Treasury:

"Trade with Mexico for twelve years.

Year ending	Imports from Mexico.	Exports to Mexico.
September 30, 1829.....	\$5,026,761.....	\$2,331,151
Do. 1830.....	5,235,241.....	4,837,458
Do. 1831.....	4,293,954.....	3,467,541
Do. 1832.....	5,452,818.....	5,408,091
Do. 1833.....	8,066,068.....	5,265,053
Do. 1834.....	9,490,446.....	9,029,021
Do. 1835.....	5,615,819.....	6,041,635
Do. 1836.....	5,654,002.....	3,880,323
Do. 1837.....	3,197,153.....	2,787,369
Do. 1838.....	3,500,707.....	2,164,097
Do. 1839.....	4,175,001.....	2,515,341
Do. 1840.....	3,284,957.....	2,036,620

"Gold and silver imported into the United States from Mexico.

	Bullion.	Specie.
South America and Mexico in 1823	\$121,970.	\$1,828,446
From Mexico.....	1826..	68,546.. 4,468,879
Do.....	1837..	165,429.. 4,405,549
Do.....	1838..	230,183.. 2,459,243
Do.....	1840..	100,976.. 3,357,936
Do.....	1841..	51,184.. 1,886,918

"By this you will observe, that, from having a trade worth upwards of nine millions of dollars in 1835, we have been reduced to a comparatively insignificant commerce of one million of dollars, at the extreme, in 1843!

"If peace be restored in Mexico and mutual confidence re-established, I can see no cause why our interests may not become replaced on their ancient basis, and a natural alliance firmly established between two sister Republics, who, in addition to a community of political tendencies, are the closest neighbors."

No. 5.

BRITISH ENCROACHMENTS.

[From Mayer's work on Mexico.]

"If there is anything that peculiarly distinguishes the statesmanship of England, it is the prospective wisdom with which its ministers (while guarding the momentary interests at home) seek new vents for the labor of its population, and for the surplus of that population also, when it becomes too crowded within the limits of the

British islands. It is the want of this vigilant policy that peculiarly characterizes our own country.

"In the midst of a vast territory, with ample room for the expansion of our inhabitants for hundreds of years, we are careless of the future, and we do not look with wariness to those geographical points of vantage around the earth of which England is gradually possessing herself, for the extension and guardianship of her commercial interests.

"We thus permit a grasping and ambitious rival to monopolize positions which, if they do not directly affect the people of our own generation, cannot fail, especially in the event of war, to injure and annoy our posterity.

"We have seen Great Britain add Afghanistan, Scinde, and the Chinese Empire, to her control within the last two years; at the same time fixing her power steadily in Canada, by the suppression of every symptom of rebellious spirit.

"We have seen her firmly planted within her fortresses at Bermuda, establishing herself at the Belize, and encroaching on Guatemala; we have seen her holding the key of the Mediterranean at Gibraltar, and the power of the Straits at Malta and the Ionian Isles; we find her in the Southern Atlantic, at St. Helena, and in the Indian seas at numberless islands; and we learn that she at last pounced, without warning, on the Hawaiian group, with the same spirit that animated her conquests in China, (although she has since officially disavowed the acts of her officer.) Britain has thus encircled the globe with her power; and in this greedy acquisition of territory and prudent husbandry of resources, our statesmen should at least perceive a warning of danger from a bold and ambitious rival, if they do not learn a lesson which, under similar circumstances, they would be studious to emulate.

"The temper of our Republic is entirely too much devoted to the interests of the passing day. We writhe under debt, and we rush into repudiation. We suffer under financial distress, and we adopt some palliative expedient that saves us from momentary ruin.

"We dislike the policy of the hour, and we attribute it exclusively to Executive misrule; and the continual distractions of the whole scheme of our popular government seem but to nourish an unceasing nervousness as to who is to rule and who to control the national patronage.

"How is she to pay England? To liquidate a portion of her debt and the interest due the United States, (of little more than \$200,000,) she was obliged to resort to a forced loan from her citizens, as you have recently observed. Suppose that a dismemberment takes place, or that England, after accumulating her claims and wrath, until she thinks the amount and energy sufficient for all exigencies, suddenly orders her minister in Mexico to demand payment, or his passports, what must inevitably be the result? I will tell you in the language of Forbes,* in order to show that this is no vain imagination of the moment excited in our American fancy. The value of California is known and appreciated in England. "California," says our author, at page 146, "is quite a distinct coun-

try from Mexico, and has nothing in common with it, except that the present inhabitants are of the same family; it is, therefore, to be apprehended that on any cause of quarrel between the two countries, it will be apt to separate itself from the parent State."

This shows you the possibility of a disunion, without any very violent effort or loss on either side; but at page 152, he boldly broaches the idea of cancelling the English debt, by a transfer of California to her creditors:

"This," says he, "would be a wise measure on the part of Mexico, if the Government could be brought to lay aside the vanity of retaining large possessions. The cession of such a disjointed part of the Republic as California, would be an advantage; in no case can it ever be profitable to the Mexican Republic, nor can it possibly remain united to it for any length of time. Therefore, by giving up this territory for the debt, would be getting rid of this last for nothing." * * *

"If California were ceded for the English debt, the creditors might be formed into a company, with the difference, that they should have a sort of sovereignty over the territory—somewhat in the manner of the East India Company. This, in my opinion, would certainly bring a revenue in time which might be equal to the debt; and, under good management and with an English population, would most certainly realize all that has been predicted of this fine country.

"Now, may not this sudden usurpation of the Sandwich Islands be a premonitory symptom—a step in advance to a movement upon Mexico? Look, for a moment, at the map of the world. England already has control of the eastern part of Asia; is looking toward her possessions of the Hudson Bay Company, and is evidently excited by our Senatorial harangues on the Oregon territory.

"Her rival, Russia, has encroached on the Californias by a settlement at Bodega, and is known to have attempted to procure the cession of an upland tract in the Hawaiian Islands, under the pretence of a desire 'for soil to cultivate wheat.' France has the Marquesas. We are prosecuting our claims in the Northwestern Territory. England requires a central rendezvous for her fleets in the Pacific, and she seizes the Sandwich Islands. They are in the direct line of trade from the west coast to China. Mexico owes Great Britain an enormous debt, which she is unable to pay.

"A project is now on foot to cross the Isthmus of Panama by a railway or canal. Steam navigation has been already introduced into the Pacific, and we all know how rapidly the facilities were advanced within a few years to reach India through the Red Sea.

"Now, I confess to you, that, combining all these circumstances—the value of the islands and the main, the greediness of England, the manner in which she has been pushing her empire all over the world—I cannot but see danger in the sudden attempt at seizure of the Hawaiian group, and think it time that the statesmen of our country should take a decided stand in the politics of this hemisphere."

"I think that I have shown the importance of these islands to our commerce, and the value of the Californias, both as a country of vast natural resources, and as a territory, which, in the hands

* Forbes was a British subject, and a consul or agent for his Government on the western coast of Mexico.

of a European Power, would become a central point, whence it might powerfully influence the future destinies of this continent.

"The Pacific coast of Spanish America," says the author I have already quoted, "is, in uninterrupted extent, equal to the whole coast of the Old World from the Naze of Norway to the Cape de Verd, in Africa. What reflections must this give rise to, when we consider that this line of coast comprehends Denmark, Germany, Holland, the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, the countries around the Mediterranean, and part of Africa? And certainly, the American shores are bounded by countries naturally more rich than all these ancient and powerful countries united."

"It seems, then, that the true wisdom of our Government should be directed toward the preservation of this immense territory intact, and under the growing influence of republican systems. A wrong step in statesmanship in our day and generation may involve us in all the foreign difficulties and questions of the "balance of power," and affect the fate of our hemisphere for centuries to come.

"If England extends her power by gradual advances from the Belize into Guatemala, (now under Indian rule,) and then into Yucatan, (now in revolt,) she will hold the key of both Americas, by controlling the passage across the Isthmus to the Pacific. If she pushes her claims on Mexico and grasps the Californias, retains her hold on China, the mouth of the Columbia, and Canada, and, while she continues the possession of the Bermudas, sweeps our eastern coast by armed war steamers, masked under the peaceful disguise of West India mail packets, (!) we will shortly find ourselves as comfortably and securely walled in by British bayonets, as the most loyal of her Majesty's subjects could well desire.

"And yet all this would be effected by mere supineness on our part, and by neglect of determined firmness and intimations similar to those of 1825,* in regard to the French fleet and the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico. If I am answered that these are dreams and visions of things that *may* occur, but perhaps will not in our day and generation, I reply, by the expression of a hope, that the period of time-serving policy is over in our Union, and that the statesmanship of America is not hereafter to be confined by a horizon of four years, or at most of eight."

A few remarks about the progressive population of the United States, and I have done.

Darby, our distinguished, but as yet ill-requited geographer, estimates, from data furnished by five censuses, from 1790 to 1840, on a calculation, the correctness of which I believe has not been questioned, and cannot be, that the population of the United States will, in 1890, amount to 74,000,000, in 1901 to 100,000,000, and before the end of another century, to more than 300,000,000! Yes, such will be the result. Our population will be 100,000,000 in little more than fifty years, when many persons, now grown, will still live; and in one hundred and fifty years, which is only a day in the age of a nation, it will be 300,000,000!

*J. Q. Adams, President, and H. Clay, Secretary of State.
See p. 388.

What a wide range of thought and calculation do these facts open. How many will then, at each of these periods, be to the square mile, if our territory remains as it now is? How may it be, if we acquire all or part of Mexico? May we not then be as crowded and as starving as Ireland or other parts of Europe by that time, if we acquire no more territory? Do not ample territory, and ample food, and full liberty, go together? Has not a civilized and increasing people a right to encroach on a savage and not increasing people? These are sublime reflections, and worthy of the philosopher; but I can pursue this no further.

Just as I had done this Appendix, I received the following document, which is so germane to the subject, and is so able, that I insert it here without comment. It requires no introduction or apology; it speaks for itself. I hope it will be read attentively by all, especially by those who oppose the further prosecution of the war:

"The Vices of Political Minorities."

"By A. B. Johnson.

Self-preservation characterizes all the regular formations of nature. Caterpillars have ever cankered trees, but the injury is only individual, while trees as a class of existences continue unabated. Wolves and owls have ever preyed on flocks and birds, but the species preyed on continue as numerous as ever. Domestic malcontents have ever struggled against social order, but civil societies preserve their organization; nature being more conservative, than destroyers are destructive. And in addition to this general preservative energy which pervades nature, Providence fortifies the principle in men, by everywhere and at all times connecting our personal interests with the interests of the society of which we are members. What God has thus joined together, men sometimes try to separate. History records occasionally an Arnold, who attempts to benefit himself by the sacrifice of the interests of his nation, but so conscious are men of the impracticability of such attempts, that even the attempts are only sufficiently numerous to exemplify their hopelessness.

Rulers, legislative and executive, being thus almost constrained by Providence to govern wisely and justly, they present to opposing partisans no means of opposition but to condemn measures that are not wrong, and to advocate alternatives that are not right. Every political minority occupies thus a false position, like a lawyer in a cause where law and equity are against him. The indiscriminate advocacy of right and wrong by lawyers is supposed to impair their ability to discern right from wrong; and the self-abuse of the intellect that is practised by minority politicians is still more pernicious, because it is more unremitting. With no fixed principle but opposition, they are like children who play the game of contrary—never letting go but when they are told to hold fast, and never holding fast but when they are told to let go; consequently, by a remarkable sympathy which exists between our feelings and our words, (few men are permanently hypocrites,) such politicians soon become the dupes of their own opposition, and lapse into a real monomania—like persons spoken of in Holy Writ, who, by a like process, are said 'to be delivered up to a strong delusion, that they believe a lie;' or, as Shakespeare paraphrases the idea,

"when we in our viciousness grow hard, the wise gods seal our eyes; in our own filth drop our clear judgments, making us adore our errors." They deem the country ever on the brink of destruction, uncorrected by experience, which is continually teaching them the falsity of preceding predictions; for, like other monomaniacs, they impute the failures to any cause but their diseased preconceptions. We have seen that when the world would not burn up, as had been predicted by Miller, the failure only occasioned the assignment of a new period for the predicted catastrophe. So we possess, everywhere, multitudes of politicians who, though old, have never known the Government perform a worthy action, or act from a worthy motive. The whole political course of our nation they deem a series of misdemeanors, for the perpetration of which the offenders escape punishment by only some strange infatuation of the people—the very doctrine of every Lunatic Asylum, whose inmates deem themselves sane, and that the insane are at large. Can monomania exhibit any delusion more unequivocal? Nor can they learn by experience that political power cannot in nature result from offences against patriotism. They offend thus continually, but continually see power within their reach. Their ascension robes are ever kept ready, but the millennium will not come; and instead thereof, public odium is showered on the unnecessary alarmists, till they have repeatedly abandoned their political name, in the hope of losing their own identification therewith, but exhibiting an entire childlike unsuspicion, that without a change of conduct, every new name must soon become as odious as the old. When, only last year, England and our country, tired of the old experiment of trying which could most harm the other, began to try whether they cannot reciprocate benefits—she by relaxing in our favor the qualified monopoly enjoyed by her agriculturists, and we relaxing in her favor the qualified monopoly enjoyed by our manufacturers—the benevolent experiment was assailed by the madness of party, and, as usual, every conceivable calamity was predicted from it. But again, as usual, the predictions are falsified. Manufactures, which were to perish, increase despite of prophecy, till even our Utica, not easily stimulated to new enterprises, is allured by the yet great profits of such operations, and resounds with new factories. Why should not two kindred countries relieve each other? Our agriculturists were becoming impoverished by the over-abundance of nature's bounties, while English manufacturers were becoming impoverished by an excess of the productions of art. Why should not the full breast of exuberant youthful America be turned to the famished lips of its aged mother? and why should we not receive from her superabundant wardrobe the articles of which we are deficient?

"All the events of history which constitute epochs in our career of glory were ushered into being under denunciations like the foregoing. And if we turn from the events of our history to the historical heroes and statesmen by whom the events were achieved, we shall find that they struggled against the denunciations of cotemporary political monomaniacs. Nothing, indeed, is more intellectually healthful than to note how the Mr. Polks of the day, whom we are invoked to hate and oppose,

mellow by time into the patriots whom our descendants are to adore. Jackson, who barely escaped from being murdered, to rid the world of a monster, is already less than half a monster deserving assassination, and more than half a patriot to be revered; while Jefferson, once the base truckler to Napoleon in the purchase of Louisiana, in despoliation of poor prostrate Spain, is so rectified by death and time, that the farmer of Marshfield, the great expounder of existing political monomania, is, if we may believe report, about to perform a pilgrimage from Massachusetts (*et tu Brute!*) to the tomb of the sage of Monticello, an event with only one similitude in history, the pilgrimage of Henry II. to the shrine of Thomas à Becket.

"Events also meliorate by time. The war with England, which in its prosecution was deemed so unnecessary and wicked that pulpits preached against it, States nullified it, and Hartford Conventions contemplated treason to arrest it, is now so traditionally glorious, as to be surpassed in public estimation by only the war of Independence. Even the recent obloquy against Texas's annexation is fading, while indications are so fast accumulating of a succeeding universal popularity, that men who failed to be early in hailing the risen star, are beginning to feel in relation to their heresy, as the lukewarm friends of young Napoleon, when they saw him looming irresistibly into imperial splendor. And doubtless, the war with Mexico, wicked, infamous, and unnecessary, as it is deemed by political monomaniacs, who can see nothing in their country's victories but murder, and nothing in Mexican aggressions but the expense of redressing them, will constitute, with its brilliant victories and great social results, one of the prime glories of our posterity. Of these results, the wilds of California and new Mexico, whose acquisition is deplored as useless and worthless, will yield their virgin bosom to millions of busy and happy men; and while the district schools of those regions will make the children thereof read in good English the history of the present day, they will be taught to look back with astonishment at the Wilmot provisos, of consumptive and stultified abolitionism, and at the kindred expedients, in Congress and out, that are now practised in reference to these regions, to frustrate God's injunction to increase and multiply and subdue the earth.


"But political minorities are subject to a worse vice than any that we have yet specified. Man is so constituted that he cannot prophesy evil without exciting in himself a desire that the prophecy shall be fulfilled. The religious fanatics who lately predicted the destruction of the world, loathed the sun when it disappointed their predictions. From this cause, more than from deficient patriotism, arises the fiendish regret which is constantly apparent in many men, when political forebodings of evil are not realized: when, for instance, manufacturers will prosper, despite the tariff of '46; when the vomito would not, last summer, extirpate our armies in Mexico, nor a mutiny at sea arrest the California volunteers and frustrate their expedition.

"But another vice of still graver import is habitual to political minorities. A prophet will aid in the fulfilment of his prophecy rather than be convicted of error. Had the power of man been as gigantic as his perversity, he would have confia-

grated the world to verify Miller's prediction. To this bad influence we must, in charity, attribute much of the destructiveness displayed by political minorities. When the deposits were removed from the United States Bank, and ruin had been predicted as a result, manufacturers closed their factories voluntarily, and dismissed their workmen; shipowners dismantled their ships, and discharged their seamen, exultingly alleging that the Government had ruined them. The same madness on the part of manufacturers began to evince itself in the early part of 1846. Opposition newspapers chronicled a few instances like the foregoing, which they hailed as the welcome harbinger of the predicted universal blight. And later still, after minority statesmen had reviled the President for claiming the whole of Oregon—a claim which he substantiated to every unprejudiced understanding—they moved heaven and earth to prevent England from yielding her conflicting pretensions, and to intimidate the President, by threats of war, from adhering to his country's rights.

"But, finally, this article is written not to irritate by crimination, but to cure, by holding naked up to vice its own image. While intellect attacks intellect, the encounter is always salutary. Controversy is never pernicious but when the feelings enlist in the fight. England, from whom we derive much of our knowledge, and most of our errors, is fast freeing herself from the political evils of factious minorities, though they are still in full bloom with us. Her Legislature never exhibits now a party in conflict with the interest of her empire. In her Oregon conflict with us, her councils and public

press exhibited no advocates for America; and while the faithful unanimity of her statesmen was urged in our Congress as a reason for our yielding our pretensions, the orators who urged the argument seemed unaware that they were condemning their own conduct, which enabled England to adduce our want of unanimity as a reason for persisting in her claims. And were England at war with Mexico, she would not possess a Mexican party, giving aid and comfort to her enemies, by parliamentary speeches and newspaper essays, that could be republished in Mexico, to heat her foreign enemies and cool her own patriotism. Party politics have been termed the madness of many for the gain of a few. Would that we could rid ourselves, like England, of at least the madness of disloyalty to our country. And what a country is ours to care for! Like the miraculous loaves and fishes of Holy Writ, the greater the number of persons it feeds, the greater is the aggregate of its surplus food. Well might one of our warriors exclaim, 'May our country always be right; but may she always be victorious, right or wrong!' President Adams preferred another sentiment: 'May our country always be victorious; but may she always be right, whether victorious or not!' But far from the heart or thought of 'the old man eloquent' was any imprecation of military defeat on his country, in case any of her contests should happen to be unjust. Doubtless in even so sad a case he would say with David of old, Let us not fall for our sins into the hands of man; but, if we must be punished, let us fall into the hands of the Lord, for his mercies are great."



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